Cross-border externalities and cooperation among representative democracies.
This paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross-border externalities by representative democracies. The level of provision of each country is decided by a policy maker elected by majority rule at the country level. We compare the case in which policy makers set their policies noncoopera...
| Publicado en: | European Economic Review Vol. 91; pp. 180 - 209 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Elsevier B.V.
Jan2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=120407883&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 120407883 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00142921 EER jtl: European Economic Review issn: 00142921 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2017 vid: 91 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier B.V. artinfo: ui: 120407883 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.10.003 ppf: 180 ppct: 29 formats: tig: atl: Cross-border externalities and cooperation among representative democracies. aug: au: Loeper, Antoine affil: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain su: Externalities Cooperation Public goods Noncooperative games (Mathematics) Tactical voting sug: subj: Externalities Cooperation Public goods Noncooperative games (Mathematics) Tactical voting keyword: Bargaining D62 D72 Election F55 Federalism H41 H77 International Cooperation Public good Strategic delegation Bargaining D62 D72 Election F55 Federalism H41 H77 International Cooperation Public good Strategic delegation ab: This paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross-border externalities by representative democracies. The level of provision of each country is decided by a policy maker elected by majority rule at the country level. We compare the case in which policy makers set their policies noncooperatively with the case in which they set their policies through Coasian cooperation. Cooperation induces policy makers to internalize cross-border externalities, but it also induces strategic voters to elect a policy maker who cares less about the public good to reduce their public good contribution. The former effect increases public good provision while the latter reduces it. We show that once voters' incentives are taken into account, whether cooperation is beneficial depends neither on voters' preferences, nor on the magnitude of spillovers, nor on the size, bargaining power, or efficiency of each country. Instead, it depends only on the curvature of the demand for the public good: cooperation increases (decreases) public good provision when the demand function is more (less) convex than the unit elastic demand function. Hence, the desirability of international cooperation depends mostly on the type of public good considered. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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