Responsibility and vigilance.
My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 174; no. 2; pp. 507 - 528 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=120629580&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 120629580 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2017 vid: 174 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 120629580 10.1007/s11098-016-0694-3 ppf: 507 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 460KB tig: atl: Responsibility and vigilance. aug: au: Murray, Samuel affil: University of Notre Dame , Notre Dame USA su: Responsibility Metaphysics Ethics Vigilance (Psychology) Salvage (Maritime) sug: subj: Responsibility Metaphysics Ethics Vigilance (Psychology) Salvage (Maritime) keyword: Cognitive neuroscience Moral agency Moral responsibility Omissions Tracing Vigilance ab: My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some to abandon the control-based account of responsibility and replace it with an alternative account. It leads others to deny the intuition that agents are responsible in these troublesome cases. After outlining the account of moral responsibility I have in mind, I look at some of the arguments made against the viability of this theory. I show that there are conceptual resources for salvaging the control account, focusing in particular on the nature of vigilance. I also argue that there is empirical data that supports the control account so conceived. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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