Globalization and Welfare Spending: How Geography and Electoral Institutions Condition Compensation.
What explains variation in the relationship between globalization and public spending on compensation across countries? This article argues that the effect of trade exposure on compensation depends on economic geography and electoral institutions. It predicts that trade leads to greater compensation...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 60; no. 4; pp. 665 - 677 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=120805433&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 120805433 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2016 vid: 60 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 120805433 10.1093/isq/sqw028 ppf: 665 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 120805433 tig: atl: Globalization and Welfare Spending: How Geography and Electoral Institutions Condition Compensation. aug: au: MENENDEZ, IRENE affil: University of Zurich su: Globalization Economic geography Public spending Welfare state Economic policy Election districts sug: subj: Globalization Economic geography Public spending Welfare state Economic policy Public Finance Activities Election districts ab: What explains variation in the relationship between globalization and public spending on compensation across countries? This article argues that the effect of trade exposure on compensation depends on economic geography and electoral institutions. It predicts that trade leads to greater compensation when trade losers are concentrated geographically and politicians have incentives to target specific constituencies. Policy proves least responsive where electoral districts are large and losers are concentrated. Moreover, in systems with small electoral districts, trade increases compensation when losers are concentrated relative to where they are dispersed. In systems with large electoral districts, trade increases compensation only when losers are dispersed. I evaluate these claims by using a panel of 14 developed democracies and a new measure of concentration. The results provide robust support for the argument. The implication is that there is no generalized relationship between globalization and spending. Rather, the welfare effects of globalization are shaped by fundamental considerations of political economy, such as geography and electoral institutions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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