A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli.
When trying to change the status quo in their favor, leaders sometimes launch sudden faits accomplis involving the costly, but limited, use of military force. In doing so, they hope that the potential defender accepts the consequences and does not pursue further military conflict. But comparatively...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 60; no. 4; pp. 742 - 753 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=120805439&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 120805439 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2016 vid: 60 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 120805439 10.1093/isq/sqw018 ppf: 742 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 120805439 tig: atl: A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli. aug: au: TARAR, AHMER affil: Texas A&M University su: International conflict Negotiation Crisis management Deterrence (Military strategy) Causes of war sug: subj: International conflict Negotiation Other Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities Crisis management Deterrence (Military strategy) Causes of war ab: When trying to change the status quo in their favor, leaders sometimes launch sudden faits accomplis involving the costly, but limited, use of military force. In doing so, they hope that the potential defender accepts the consequences and does not pursue further military conflict. But comparatively little scholarship tries to explain the use of this strategy. I examine the logic for engaging in a fait accompli from within the rationalist bargaining approach to understanding costly military conflict. My analysis identifies informational and commitment problems that can cause a leader to undertake a fait accompli, as well as an informational problem under which the fait accompli can trigger an unwanted war with the potential defender. My model also applies to dilemmas of extended deterrence; it provides some new insights into this area as well. Overall, it helps explain wars that are not preceded by crisis bargaining. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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