Causes and Counterparts.
It follows from David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality and his counterfactual theory of causation that causal claims are relativized to a set of counterpart relations. Call this Shlewis's view. I show how Shlewis's view can provide attractively unified solutions to similar modal an...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 95; no. 1; pp. 17 - 29 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=120999789&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 120999789 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2017 vid: 95 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 120999789 10.1080/00048402.2016.1157695 ppf: 17 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 318KB tig: atl: Causes and Counterparts. aug: au: Kaiserman, Alex affil: Jesus College, University of Oxford su: Causation (Philosophy) Modality (Theory of knowledge) Counterfactuals (Logic) Conditionals (Logic) Lewis, David B., 1945- sug: subj: Causation (Philosophy) Modality (Theory of knowledge) Counterfactuals (Logic) Conditionals (Logic) Lewis, David B., 1945- keyword: causation contrastivism counterfactuals counterpart theory events ab: It follows from David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality and his counterfactual theory of causation that causal claims are relativized to a set of counterpart relations. Call this Shlewis's view. I show how Shlewis's view can provide attractively unified solutions to similar modal and causal puzzles. I then argue that Shlewis's view is better motivated, by his own lights, than the view Lewis actually held, and also better motivated than a similar approach which relativizes causal claims to sets of ‘contrast events’. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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