Cartel Organization, Price Discrimination, and Selection of Transatlantic Migrants: 1899-1911.
We study the effects of trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels on tourist/business and migrant traffic. Collusion had a smaller effect on first and second class service relative to third class service. Its effects were proportionately stronger eastbound, but less important in absolute numbers giv...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 83; no. 3; pp. 668 - 705 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=120999910&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 120999910 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2017 vid: 83 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 120999910 10.1002/soej.12175 ppf: 668 ppct: 37 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 421KB tig: atl: Cartel Organization, Price Discrimination, and Selection of Transatlantic Migrants: 1899-1911. aug: au: Deltas, George Sicotte, Richard affil: University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1407 W. Gregory, Urbana, IL 61801, USA University of Vermont, 239 Old Mill, 94 Univ. Place, Burlington, VT 05405, USA su: Immigrants Cartels Maritime shipping Tourists Collusion sug: subj: Immigrants Deep sea, coastal and Great Lakes water transportation (except by ferries) Navigational Services to Shipping Other Support Activities for Water Transportation Marine shipping agencies Cartels Maritime shipping Tourists Collusion keyword: L92 N71 N73 L92 N71 N73 ab: We study the effects of trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels on tourist/business and migrant traffic. Collusion had a smaller effect on first and second class service relative to third class service. Its effects were proportionately stronger eastbound, but less important in absolute numbers given smaller eastbound traffic. Collusion-driven consumer substitution across classes was small but non-negligible. Thus, collusion affected migrant traffic far more than tourist/business traffic. We also confirm that collusion led to higher fares across all cabin classes, especially for steerage. We construct and calibrate an analytical model and show that the pattern of observed prices and volumes are consistent with a profit-maximizing cartel, thus buttressing the hypothesis that the collusion effects were causal. Finally, we document that collusion led to positive selection of migrants, as measured by literacy rates and financial resources. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|