Invariant Equivocation.
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one's evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agent-dependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabili...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 82; no. 1; pp. 141 - 168 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Feb2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=121120393&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 121120393 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2017 vid: 82 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 121120393 10.1007/s10670-016-9810-1 ppf: 141 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 689KB tig: atl: Invariant Equivocation. aug: au: Landes, Jürgen Masterton, George affil: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilians-Universität München , Munich Germany Lund University , Lund Sweden su: Equivocation Probability theory Truth Ambiguity Specific gravity sug: subj: Equivocation Probability theory Truth Ambiguity Specific gravity ab: Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one's evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agent-dependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one's evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard to the probability function one should adopt as one's belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one's evidence while Masterton advocates selecting the expected probability function relative to the density function with greatest entropy compatible with one's evidence. In this paper we discuss the significant relative strengths of these two positions. In particular, Masterton's original proposal is further developed and investigated to reveal its significant properties; including its equivalence to the centre of mass inference process and its ability to accommodate higher order evidence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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