Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services.
We investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product-specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable retail services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consum...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 48; no. 1; pp. 3 - 24 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=121147688&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 121147688 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2017 vid: 48 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 121147688 10.1111/1756-2171.12165 ppf: 3 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 280KB tig: atl: Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services. aug: au: Hunold, Matthias Muthers, Johannes affil: Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) at the Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf Julius‐Maximilians‐Universität Würzburg su: Retail industry Economic competition Prisoner's dilemma game Price maintenance Manufactured products Resale sug: subj: Retail industry Economic competition Prisoner's dilemma game All other miscellaneous manufacturing All Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores) All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores) Price maintenance Manufactured products Resale ab: We investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product-specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable retail services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer prices and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even reducing, the overall level of retail services. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM may distort the allocation of services toward the high-priced products of the manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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