Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations.
I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to $$\upvarphi $$ in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both p...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 194; no. 2; pp. 511 - 531 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=121163191&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 121163191 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2017 vid: 194 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 121163191 10.1007/s11229-015-0956-1 ppf: 511 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 468KB tig: atl: Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations. aug: au: Levy, Neil affil: Department of Philosophy , Macquarie University , Sydney Australia su: Theory of knowledge Intellectuals Motor ability Epistemics Football players sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Intellectuals Motor ability Epistemics Football players keyword: Epistemology Knowledge-how Motor representations Stanley ab: I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to $$\upvarphi $$ in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both propositional knowledge and motor representations. Motor representations are not mere dispositions to behavior (so the older dispositionalist view isn't even half right) because they have representational content, and they play a central role in realizing the intelligence in knowledge-how. But since motor representations are not propositional, propositional knowledge is not sufficient for knowledge-how. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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