Prediction in general relativity.

Several authors have claimed that prediction is essentially impossible in the general theory of relativity, the case being particularly strong, it is said, when one fully considers the epistemic predicament of the observer. Each of these claims rests on the support of an underdetermination argument...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 194; no. 2; pp. 491 - 510
Autor principal: McCoy, C.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Feb2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: Department of Philosophy , University of California San Diego , La Jolla 92093 USA
      su:
        General relativity (Physics)
        Logical prediction
        Epistemics
        Spacetime
        Theory of knowledge
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          General relativity (Physics)
          Logical prediction
          Epistemics
          Spacetime
          Theory of knowledge
      keyword:
        General theory of relativity
        Global spacetime structure
        Prediction
        Theory interpretation
      ab: Several authors have claimed that prediction is essentially impossible in the general theory of relativity, the case being particularly strong, it is said, when one fully considers the epistemic predicament of the observer. Each of these claims rests on the support of an underdetermination argument and a particular interpretation of the concept of prediction. I argue that these underdetermination arguments fail and depend on an implausible explication of prediction in the theory. The technical results adduced in these arguments can be related to certain epistemic issues, but can only be misleadingly or mistakenly characterized as related to prediction.
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