Open knowledge and changing the subject.

Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or n...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 174; no. 4; pp. 1047 - 1072
Autor principal: Yablo, Stephen
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Yablo, Stephen
        affil: Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT , Cambridge USA
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        Theory of knowledge
        Dogmatism
        Illusion (Philosophy)
        Evidence
        Closure (Psychology)
        Probability theory
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          Theory of knowledge
          Dogmatism
          Illusion (Philosophy)
          Evidence
          Closure (Psychology)
          Probability theory
      keyword:
        Closure
        Credence
        Deduction
        Knowledge
        Transmission failure
      ab: Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of 'intimations of openness' (IONs)? This paper compares two styles of explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P's probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P's subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q.
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      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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