An ounce of prevention: opportunity structures for white-collar crime in environmental markets.
Markets, in which participants are given a right to pollute that can be bought and sold, are an increasingly popular form of environmental regulation. The bulk of research in this area focuses on market implementation, efficiency, and effectiveness, but merely notes the need for strong government ov...
| Publicado en: | Crime, Law & Social Change Vol. 67; no. 2; pp. 133 - 152 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=121919301&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 121919301 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09254994 CRG jtl: Crime, Law & Social Change issn: 09254994 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2017 vid: 67 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 121919301 10.1007/s10611-016-9667-x ppf: 133 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 464KB tig: atl: An ounce of prevention: opportunity structures for white-collar crime in environmental markets. aug: au: Gibbs, Carole Pugh, Denzel affil: School of Criminal Justice , Michigan State University , 655 Auditorium Rd. Room #508 East Lansing 48824 USA su: United States White collar crimes Environmental regulations Commercial crimes Fraud Environmental policy sug: subj: White collar crimes Environmental regulations Commercial crimes Fraud Environmental policy United States Other provincial and territorial public administration Administration of Air and Water Resource and Solid Waste Management Programs keyword: ARP Environmental crime Opportunity theory RFS RINs White-collar crime ARP Environmental crime Opportunity theory RFS RINs White-collar crime ab: Markets, in which participants are given a right to pollute that can be bought and sold, are an increasingly popular form of environmental regulation. The bulk of research in this area focuses on market implementation, efficiency, and effectiveness, but merely notes the need for strong government oversight. Despite large-scale instances of fraud in several markets, detailed understanding of what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will effectively protect market participants is lacking. Research on criminal opportunities is primarily limited to a few studies of the European carbon market. In the following paper, we begin to fill this gap in the literature. We draw upon Benson and colleagues' extensions of routine activities and situational crime prevention theories to examine how business systems, processes, and networks increase or reduce opportunities for white-collar crime. Specifically, we assess whether these reconceptualized opportunity theories explain the differing levels of known white-collar crime in two domestic markets: the United States Acid Rain Program and the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard Program. Implications for theory and practice will be discussed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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