Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.
Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constit...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 44; no. 4; pp. 1185 - 1209 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=122141146&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 122141146 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2016 vid: 44 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 122141146 10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3 ppf: 1185 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 449KB tig: atl: Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat. aug: au: Baiasu, Sorin affil: Philosophy Programme, School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment , Keele University , Keele ST5 5BG UK su: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Normativity (Ethics) Argument Practical reason Constructivism (Philosophy) Korsgaard, Christine sug: subj: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Normativity (Ethics) Argument Practical reason Constructivism (Philosophy) Korsgaard, Christine keyword: Anaytic/synthetic Christine Korsgaard Constitutivism Constructivism Immanuel Kant Metaphysics Michael Smith Transcendental argument ab: Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic - whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard's transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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