KODĖL ARISTOTELIS NESVARSTĖ TUŠČIŲ TERMINŲ PROBLEMOS?

The article deals with the problem of empty terms in the Aristotelian square of opposition. There has been an attitude prevalent amongst modern logicians that propositions with empty terms pose the problem of undue existential import and, in order to avoid it, the relations of contrariety, subcontra...

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Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 91; pp. 141 - 156
Autor principal: Pabijutaitė, Živilė
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2017
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: 2017
      vid: 91
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      pub: Vilnius University
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        10.15388/Problemos.2017.91.10507
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        atl: KODĖL ARISTOTELIS NESVARSTĖ TUŠČIŲ TERMINŲ PROBLEMOS?
      aug:
        au: Pabijutaitė, Živilė
        affil: Vilniaus universiteto Filosofijos istorijos ir logikos katedra Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513
      sug:
      keyword:
        empty terms
        existential import
        square of opposition
        egzistavimo importas
        loginis kvadratas
        tušti terminai
      ab:
        The article deals with the problem of empty terms in the Aristotelian square of opposition. There has been an attitude prevalent amongst modern logicians that propositions with empty terms pose the problem of undue existential import and, in order to avoid it, the relations of contrariety, subcontrariety and subalternation must be rejected. We present the problem of propositions with empty terms in the form of a paradox: (1) empty terms are an integral part of Aristotelian logic; (2) particular O proposition with an empty term cannot be true (because of existential import); (3) particular O proposition with an empty term is true (because of the relations of the square). After other main possible solutions to the paradox are outlined, it is argued that neither universal nor particular statements had existential import in the traditional Aristotelian logic, therefore, the second premise is rejected. We formulate our theory as a strongly modified version of the traditional interpretation of the square - although endorsing its main thesis that terms in the Aristotelian logic were not "empty" in the modern sense and, as a result, propositions with such terms have to be treated in the exact same way others are, we do not understand "is" as existential in any sense and suspend any talk about existence in the Aristotelian square. We base our solution on the recent attempts to offer an intensional (as opposed to long-time dominant extensional) interpretation of categorical terms.
        Straipsnio objektas yra teiginių su tuščiais terminais aristoteliškajame loginiame kvadrate analizė. Moderniojoje logikoje vyrauja nuostata, jog teiginiai su tuščiais terminais yra neteisėto egzistavimo importo (undue existential import) priežastis - siekiant jo išvengti, atsisakyta priešingumo, popriešingumo ir pavaldumo ryšių. Teiginių su tuščiais terminais problema straipsnyje pristatoma paradokso pavidalu: 1) teiginiai su terminais, neturinčiais referento, funkcionuoja loginiame kvadrate; 2) dalinis teiginys O su tuščiu terminu negali būti teisingas (dėl egzistavimo importo); 3) dalinis teiginys O su tuščiu terminu yra teisingas (dėl loginio kvadrato ryšių). Aptarus kitus pagrindinius paradokso sprendimo būdus, įrodinėjama, jog tradicinėje Aristotelio logikoje nei bendriesiems, nei daliniams teiginiams nebuvo būdingas egzistavimo importas - taigi, atmetama antroji prielaida. Sprendimas pristatomas kaip modifikuota tradicinės kvadrato interpretacijos versija: sutikdami su pagrindine jos teze, kad Aristotelio logikoje terminai nebuvo „tušti" šiuolaikine prasme ir todėl teiginiams su tokiais terminais galioja tie patys principai kaip ir bet kuriems kitiems, nemanome, jog jungtis „yra" išreiškia bet kokio pobūdžio egzistavimą, ir klausimą apie objektų egzistavimą paliekame už aristoteliškojo loginio kvadrato ribų. Siūlomas paradokso Aristotelio sistemoje sprendimas grindžiamas pastarųjų metų bandymais interpretuoti terminų logiką intensiniu pagrindu.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: Lithuanian
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      custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
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          year: 2017
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