Kant and experimental philosophy.
While Kant introduces his critical philosophy in continuity with the experimental tradition begun by Francis Bacon, it is widely accepted that his Copernican revolution places experimental physics outside the bounds of science. Yet scholars have recently contested this view. They argue that inCritiq...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 25; no. 2; pp. 265 - 287 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=122658168&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 122658168 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2017 vid: 25 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 122658168 10.1080/09608788.2016.1268996 ppf: 265 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Kant and experimental philosophy. aug: au: Cooper, Andrew affil: Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UK su: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Experimental philosophy Critique of the Power of Judgment (Book) Buffon, Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de, 1707-1788 Bacon, Francis, 1561-1626 Vitalism History sug: subj: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Experimental philosophy Critique of the Power of Judgment (Book) Buffon, Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de, 1707-1788 Bacon, Francis, 1561-1626 Vitalism History keyword: Carl Linnaeus Critique of the Power of Judgment experimental philosophy Francis Bacon Georges Buffon Immanuel Kant ab: While Kant introduces his critical philosophy in continuity with the experimental tradition begun by Francis Bacon, it is widely accepted that his Copernican revolution places experimental physics outside the bounds of science. Yet scholars have recently contested this view. They argue that inCritique of the Power of JudgmentKant’s engagement with the growing influence of vitalism in the 1780s leads to an account of nature’s formative power that returns experimental physics within scientific parameters. Several critics are sceptical of this revised reading. They argue that Kant’s thirdCritiqueserves precisely to deflate the epistemological status of experimental physics, thereby protecting science from the threat of vitalism. In this paper I examine Kant’s account of science in the context of the experimental tradition of philosophy, particularly in relation to the generation dilemma of the eighteenth century. I argue that Kant does not deflate the epistemological status of experimental physics but rather introduces systematicity to the experimental tradition. By identifying the reflective use of reason to organize laws of experience into a systematic whole, Kant aims to ground experimental inquiry on the secure course of a science, opening a conception of science as a research programme. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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