Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation.
Many authors have proposed mechanisms to induce regulated polluting firms to truthfully reveal their private information. This paper proposes an alternative scheme in which the regulator offers each firm a menu of linear price-quantity contracts; faced with this menu, each firm′s dominant strategy i...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 83; pp. 1 - 8 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
May2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=122721071&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 122721071 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00950696 EEM jtl: Journal of Environmental Economics & Management issn: 00950696 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2017 vid: 83 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 122721071 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.11.008 ppf: 1 ppct: 7 formats: tig: atl: Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation. aug: au: Shrestha, Ratna K. affil: Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 6000 Iona Drive, Vancouver, Canada V6T 1L4 su: Environmental regulations Elasticity (Economics) Pricing Quantity theory of money Business finance sug: subj: Environmental regulations Elasticity (Economics) All other non-depository credit intermediation Administration of Air and Water Resource and Solid Waste Management Programs Pricing Quantity theory of money Business finance keyword: D82 Dominant strategy H23 L51 Menus Pecuniary externality Q58 Residual damage D82 Dominant strategy H23 L51 Menus Pecuniary externality Q58 Residual damage ab: Many authors have proposed mechanisms to induce regulated polluting firms to truthfully reveal their private information. This paper proposes an alternative scheme in which the regulator offers each firm a menu of linear price-quantity contracts; faced with this menu, each firm′s dominant strategy is to truthfully report its private information and self-select the contract that is ex post efficient. The proposed menu schedule that is more elastic than the firm′s residual marginal damage function engenders a positive quantity effect, thereby counterbalancing the firm′s incentive to misreport prompted by the linearity of price. Due to its built-in price quantity structure, the scheme performs as designed regardless of the elasticities of marginal damage and demand functions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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