Can Consequences Be Right-Makers?
This paper sets out a novel challenge to consequentialism as a theory in normative ethics. The challenge is rooted in the ontological claim that consequences of actions do not exist at the time required to be that in virtue of which actions are right or wrong, and so consequences cannot play the rol...
| Published in: | Philosophia Vol. 45; no. 1; pp. 185 - 206 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Mar2017
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=122762163&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 122762163 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2017 vid: 45 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 122762163 10.1007/s11406-016-9757-0 ppf: 185 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 402KB tig: atl: Can Consequences Be Right-Makers? aug: au: Boulter, Stephen affil: Department of History, Philosophy and Religion , Oxford Brookes University , Harcourt Hill Campus Oxford OX2 9AT UK su: Consequentialism (Ethics) Ethics Plausibility (Logic) Natural law Presentism (Philosophy) sug: subj: Consequentialism (Ethics) Ethics Plausibility (Logic) Natural law Presentism (Philosophy) keyword: Consequentialism Natural law theory Possible worlds Practical rationality Presentism Quasi-consequentialism Relations Right-makers ab: This paper sets out a novel challenge to consequentialism as a theory in normative ethics. The challenge is rooted in the ontological claim that consequences of actions do not exist at the time required to be that in virtue of which actions are right or wrong, and so consequences cannot play the role attributed to them by consequentialists. The challenge takes the form of a dilemma. The consequentialist is confronted with a set of propositions she will find individually plausible but incompossible if taken in conjunction with consequentialism. The task is to restore consistency. There are ways of maintaining the view that consequences are right-makers, but they come at the cost of endorsing highly implausible and unattractive theses. Versions of what might be called quasi-consequentialism can be rendered metaphysically coherent, but these are consequentialisms in name only, and they are best seen as components of an account of practical rationality that has strong echoes of traditional Natural Law theory. Since this is unlikely to appeal to contemporary consequentialists, their best bet is to reject consequentialism altogether. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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