Structural entailment and semantic natural kinds.

Is there a principled difference between entailments in natural language that are valid solely in virtue of their form or structure and those that are not? This paper advances an affirmative answer to this question, one that takes as its starting point Gareth Evans's suggestion that semantic theory...

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Publicado en:Linguistics & Philosophy Vol. 40; no. 3; pp. 207 - 238
Autor principal: Balcerak Jackson, Brendan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Entailment (Logic)
        Causation (Philosophy)
        Semantics
        Language & languages
        Adverbs
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          Entailment (Logic)
          Causation (Philosophy)
          Semantics
          Language & languages
          Adverbs
      keyword:
        Entailment
        Model-theoretic semantics
        Montague
        Semantic categories
        Semantic natural kinds
        Semantic structure
      ab: Is there a principled difference between entailments in natural language that are valid solely in virtue of their form or structure and those that are not? This paper advances an affirmative answer to this question, one that takes as its starting point Gareth Evans's suggestion that semantic theory aims to carve reality at the joints by uncovering the semantic natural kinds of the language. I sketch an Evans-inspired account of semantic kinds and show how it supports a principled account of structural entailment. I illustrate the account by application to a case study involving the entailment properties of adverbs; this involves developing a novel proposal about the semantics for adverbs like 'quickly' and 'slowly'. In the course of the discussion I explore some implications of the account for the place of model-theoretic tools in natural language semantics.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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