A meta-analysis of response-time tests of the sequential two-systems model of moral judgment.
The (generalized) sequential two-system ('default interventionist') model of utilitarian moral judgment predicts that utilitarian responses often arise from a system-two correction of system-one deontological intuitions. Response-time (RT) results that seem to support this model are usually explaine...
| Publicado en: | Memory & Cognition Vol. 45; no. 4; pp. 566 - 576 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=123084269&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 123084269 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0090502X MEG jtl: Memory & Cognition issn: 0090502X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2017 vid: 45 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 123084269 10.3758/s13421-016-0686-8 ppf: 566 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 439KB tig: atl: A meta-analysis of response-time tests of the sequential two-systems model of moral judgment. aug: au: Baron, Jonathan Gürçay, Burcu affil: Department of Psychology , University of Pennsylvania , 3720 Walnut St. Philadelphia 19104-6241 USA su: Intuition Ethical decision making Meta-analysis Probability theory Reaction time Statistics Data analysis sug: subj: Intuition Ethical decision making Meta-analysis Probability theory Reaction time Statistics Data analysis keyword: drift diffusion Dual-systems Moral judgment Response Time drift diffusion Dual-systems Moral judgment Response Time ab: The (generalized) sequential two-system ('default interventionist') model of utilitarian moral judgment predicts that utilitarian responses often arise from a system-two correction of system-one deontological intuitions. Response-time (RT) results that seem to support this model are usually explained by the fact that low-probability responses have longer RTs. Following earlier results, we predicted response probability from each subject's tendency to make utilitarian responses (A, 'Ability') and each dilemma's tendency to elicit deontological responses (D, 'Difficulty'), estimated from a Rasch model. At the point where A = D, the two responses are equally likely, so probability effects cannot account for any RT differences between them. The sequential two-system model still predicts that many of the utilitarian responses made at this point will result from system-two corrections of system-one intuitions, hence should take longer. However, when A = D, RT for the two responses was the same, contradicting the sequential model. Here we report a meta-analysis of 26 data sets, which replicated the earlier results of no RT difference overall at the point where A = D. The data sets used three different kinds of moral judgment items, and the RT equality at the point where A = D held for all three. In addition, we found that RT increased with A-D. This result holds for subjects (characterized by Ability) but not for items (characterized by Difficulty). We explain the main features of this unanticipated effect, and of the main results, with a drift-diffusion model. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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