Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflage.
I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception (ECP) according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a give...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 194; no. 5; pp. 1531 - 1540 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=123085371&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 123085371 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2017 vid: 194 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 123085371 10.1007/s11229-015-0758-5 ppf: 1531 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 377KB tig: atl: Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflage. aug: au: Dokic, Jérôme affil: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales , Institut Jean-Nicod , 29 rue d'Ulm 75005 Paris France su: Theory of knowledge Sensory perception Art & camouflage Hysteresis Epistemic logic sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Sensory perception Art & camouflage Hysteresis Epistemic logic keyword: Knowledge Margins for error Perception Perceptual camouflage Perceptual hysteresis ab: I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception (ECP) according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following triad of claims is true: (i) The experience presents a given state of affairs (it has propositional content); (ii) The experience is veridical; (iii) The experience cannot yield the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains (even in the absence of relevant defeaters). This case involves an empirically well-studied phenomenon, namely perceptual hysteresis, which involves the maintenance of a perceptual experience with a relatively stable content over progressively degrading sensory stimulations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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