Epistemology versus non-causal realism.
This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are sometimes missed in discussions of episte...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 194; no. 5; pp. 1643 - 1663 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=123085385&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 123085385 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2017 vid: 194 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 123085385 10.1007/s11229-015-1010-z ppf: 1643 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 502KB tig: atl: Epistemology versus non-causal realism. aug: au: Warren, Jared affil: Jacksonville USA su: Theory of knowledge Socialist realism Reliability (Personality trait) Rationalism Philosophy sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Socialist realism Reliability (Personality trait) Rationalism Philosophy keyword: Epistemological arguments against realism Epistemology Realism Reliability challenge ab: This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are sometimes missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument-non-causal realism-and argue that any non-causal realist theory, no matter the subject matter, cannot be given a reasonable epistemology and so should be rejected. Finally I discuss and respond to several possible responses to the argument. In addition to clearing up and avoiding numerous misunderstandings of arguments of this kind that are quite common in the literature, this paper aims to present and endorse a rigorous and fully general epistemological argument against realism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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