Learning from Simple Indicative Conditionals.
An agent who receives information in the form of an indicative conditional statement and who trusts her source will modify her credences to bring them in line with the conditional. I will argue that the agent, upon the acquisition of such information, should, in general, expand her prior credence fu...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 82; no. 3; pp. 583 - 602 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jun2017
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=123150871&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 123150871 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2017 vid: 82 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 123150871 10.1007/s10670-016-9833-7 ppf: 583 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 470KB tig: atl: Learning from Simple Indicative Conditionals. aug: au: Huisman, Leendert affil: South Burlington USA su: Bayesian analysis Information theory Cognitive processing of language Expressive language Semantics (Philosophy) Meaning (Psychology) sug: subj: Bayesian analysis Information theory Cognitive processing of language Expressive language Semantics (Philosophy) Meaning (Psychology) ab: An agent who receives information in the form of an indicative conditional statement and who trusts her source will modify her credences to bring them in line with the conditional. I will argue that the agent, upon the acquisition of such information, should, in general, expand her prior credence function to an indeterminate posterior one; that is, to a set of credence functions. Two different ways the agent might interpret the conditional will be presented, and the properties of the resulting indeterminate posteriors compared. The cause of the expansion from a single prior credence function to a set of credence functions forming the indeterminate posterior one will be explained. The expansion undermines the Bayesian dogma that the result of assimilating new information into a determinate prior credence functions is always a determinate posterior one. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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