'That Will Do': Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency.

We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency (often interpreted as obligation, resp. strong permission), as originally proposed in van Benthem (Bull Sect Log 8(1):36-41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some sta...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 82; no. 3; pp. 473 - 512
Autor principal: Putte, Frederik
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2017
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Putte, Frederik
        affil: Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Arts and Humanities , Ghent University , Blandijnberg 2 9000 Ghent Belgium
      su:
        Deontic logic
        Cognitive processing of language
        Expressive language
        Meaning (Psychology)
        Semantics (Philosophy)
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          Deontic logic
          Cognitive processing of language
          Expressive language
          Meaning (Psychology)
          Semantics (Philosophy)
      ab: We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency (often interpreted as obligation, resp. strong permission), as originally proposed in van Benthem (Bull Sect Log 8(1):36-41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of 'obligation as weakest permission' from Anglberger et al. (Rev Symb Log 8(4):807-827, 2015).
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      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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