Message Exchange Games in Strategic Contexts.
When two people engage in a conversation, knowingly or unknowingly, they are playing a game. Players of such games have diverse objectives, or winning conditions: an applicant trying to convince her potential employer of her eligibility over that of a competitor, a prosecutor trying to convict a def...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 46; no. 4; pp. 355 - 405 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=123992421&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 123992421 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2017 vid: 46 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 123992421 10.1007/s10992-016-9402-1 ppf: 355 ppct: 50 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 853KB tig: atl: Message Exchange Games in Strategic Contexts. aug: au: Asher, Nicholas Paul, Soumya Venant, Antoine affil: CNRS , IRIT , Toulouse France Université de Toulouse 3, IRIT , Toulouse France su: Conversation analysis Game theory Dialogue Language & culture Reasoning sug: subj: Conversation analysis Game theory Dialogue Language & culture Reasoning keyword: Philosophy of language Strategic reasoning ab: When two people engage in a conversation, knowingly or unknowingly, they are playing a game. Players of such games have diverse objectives, or winning conditions: an applicant trying to convince her potential employer of her eligibility over that of a competitor, a prosecutor trying to convict a defendant, a politician trying to convince an electorate in a political debate, and so on. We argue that infinitary games offer a natural model for many structural characteristics of such conversations. We call such games message exchange games, and we compare them to existing game theoretic frameworks used in linguistics-for example, signaling games-and show that message exchange games are needed to handle non-cooperative conversation. In this paper, we concentrate on conversational games where players' interests are opposed. We provide a taxonomy of conversations based on their winning conditions, and we investigate some essential features of winning conditions like consistency and what we call rhetorical cooperativity. We show that these features make our games decomposition sensitive, a property we define formally in the paper. We show that this property has far-reaching implications for the existence of winning strategies and their complexity. There is a class of winning conditions (decomposition invariant winning conditions) for which message exchange games are equivalent to Banach- Mazur games, which have been extensively studied and enjoy nice topological results. But decomposition sensitive goals are much more the norm and much more interesting linguistically and philosophically. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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