Time Travel and Consistency Constraints.

The possibility of time travel, as permitted in General Relativity, is responsible for constraining physical fields beyond what laws of nature would otherwise require. In the special case where time travel is limited to a single object returning to the past and interacting with itself, consistency c...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1098 - 1114
Autor principal: Kutach, Douglas N.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2003
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Time travel
        Physical sciences
        General relativity (Physics)
        Hypergeometric series
        Homotopy theory
        Topology
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          Time travel
          Physical sciences
          General relativity (Physics)
          Hypergeometric series
          Homotopy theory
          Topology
      ab: The possibility of time travel, as permitted in General Relativity, is responsible for constraining physical fields beyond what laws of nature would otherwise require. In the special case where time travel is limited to a single object returning to the past and interacting with itself, consistency constraints can be avoided if the dynamics is continuous and the object's state space satisfies a certain topological requirement: that all null-homotopic mappings from the state-space to itself have some fixed point. Where consistency constraints do exist, no new physics is needed to enforce them. One needs only to accept certain global topological constraints as laws, something that is reasonable in any case.
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