Underdetermination and the Problem of Identical Rivals.
If two theory formulations are merely different expressions of the same theory, then any problem of choosing between them cannot be due to the underdetermination of theories by data. So one might suspect that we need to be able to tell distinct theories from mere alternate formulations before we can...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1256 - 1265 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=12413949&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 12413949 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2003 vid: 70 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 12413949 10.1086/377405 ppf: 1256 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 78KB tig: atl: Underdetermination and the Problem of Identical Rivals. aug: au: Magnus, P. D. su: Atomic theory Metaphysical cosmology Quantum theory Electrons Protons Matrix mechanics Wave mechanics Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1908-2000 sug: subj: Atomic theory Metaphysical cosmology Quantum theory Electrons Protons Matrix mechanics Wave mechanics Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1908-2000 ab: If two theory formulations are merely different expressions of the same theory, then any problem of choosing between them cannot be due to the underdetermination of theories by data. So one might suspect that we need to be able to tell distinct theories from mere alternate formulations before we can say anything substantive about underdetermination, that we need to solve the problem of identical rivals before addressing the problem of underdetermination. Here I consider two possible solutions: Quine proposes that we call two theories identical if they are equivalent under a reconstrual of predicates, but this would mishandle important cases. Another proposal is to defer to the particular judgements of actual scientists. Consideration of an historical episode—the alleged equivalence of wave and matrix mechanics—shows that this second proposal also fails. Nevertheless, I suggest, the original suspicion is wrong; there are ways to enquire into underdetermination without having solved the problem of identical rivals. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2003 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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