Interpretations of Probability in Evolutionary Theory.

The ubiquitous probabilities of evolutionary theory (ET) spark the question: Which interpretation of probability is the most appropriate for ET? There is reason to think that, whatever we take probabilities in ET to be, they must be consistent with both determinism and indeterminism. I argue that th...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1317 - 1329
Autor principal: Millstein, Roberta L.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2003
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=12413967&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 12413967
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318248
        PSC
      jtl: Philosophy of Science
      issn: 00318248
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Dec2003
      vid: 70
      iid: 5
      pid: 15979
      pub: Cambridge University Press
    artinfo:
      ui:
        12413967
        10.1086/377410
      ppf: 1317
      ppct: 12
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 97KB
      tig:
        atl: Interpretations of Probability in Evolutionary Theory.
      aug:
        au: Millstein, Roberta L.
      su:
        Probability theory
        Philosophy
        Evolutionary theories
        Determinism (Philosophy)
        Quantum theory
        Glacial drift
        Epistemics
        Realism
      sug:
        subj:
          Probability theory
          Philosophy
          Evolutionary theories
          Determinism (Philosophy)
          Quantum theory
          Glacial drift
          Epistemics
          Realism
      ab: The ubiquitous probabilities of evolutionary theory (ET) spark the question: Which interpretation of probability is the most appropriate for ET? There is reason to think that, whatever we take probabilities in ET to be, they must be consistent with both determinism and indeterminism. I argue that the probabilities used in ET are objective in a realist sense, if not in an indeterministic sense. Furthermore, there are a number of interpretations of probability that are objective and would be consistent with deterministic evolution and indeterministic evolution. However, I suggest that evolutionary probabilities are best understood as propensities of population-level kinds.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Philosophy of Science
      holder: Cambridge University Press
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2003
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N