A Parser as an Epistemic Artifact: A Material View on Models.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that models in scientific practice can be conceived of as epistemic artifacts. Approaching models this way accommodates many such things that working scientists themselves call models but that the semantic conception of models does not duly recognize as such....
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1484 - 1496 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=12414047&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 12414047 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2003 vid: 70 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 12414047 10.1086/377424 ppf: 1484 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 93KB tig: atl: A Parser as an Epistemic Artifact: A Material View on Models. aug: au: Knuuttila, Tarja Voutilainen, Atro su: Epistemics Parsing (Computer grammar) Mathematical models Surplus value Morrison, Margaret Morgan, Mary sug: subj: Epistemics Parsing (Computer grammar) Mathematical models Surplus value Morrison, Margaret Morgan, Mary ab: The purpose of this paper is to suggest that models in scientific practice can be conceived of as epistemic artifacts. Approaching models this way accommodates many such things that working scientists themselves call models but that the semantic conception of models does not duly recognize as such. That models are epistemic artifacts implies, firstly, that they cannot be understood apart from purposeful human activity; secondly, that they are somehow materialized inhabitants of the intersubjective field of that activity; and thirdly, that they can function also as knowledge objects. We argue that models as epistemic artifacts provide knowledge in many other ways than just via direct representative links. To substantiate our view we use a language-technological artifact, a parser, as an example. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2003 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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