Pointers: The Missing Link between Intentionality and Reference.
Reference can fail in a way that intentionality cannot. Though the stream of phenomenal experience typically does not fail to target (be about, refer to) objects outside, it may do. How does the mind go about targeting objects beyond itself? The speculative conjecture of this paper is that it does s...
| Publicado en: | Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol. 94; no. 3; pp. 381 - 391 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=124603409&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 124603409 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01659227 NFG jtl: Grazer Philosophische Studien issn: 01659227 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2017 vid: 94 iid: 3 pid: 639 pub: Brill Academic Publishers artinfo: ui: 124603409 10.1163/18756735-09403005 ppf: 381 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 424KB tig: atl: Pointers: The Missing Link between Intentionality and Reference. aug: au: Simons, Peter affil: Trinity College Dublin su: Pointing (Gesture) Intentionality (Philosophy) Act psychology Phenomenology Action theory (Psychology) sug: subj: Pointing (Gesture) Intentionality (Philosophy) Act psychology Phenomenology Action theory (Psychology) keyword: indexicality intentionality pointer pointing reference ab: Reference can fail in a way that intentionality cannot. Though the stream of phenomenal experience typically does not fail to target (be about, refer to) objects outside, it may do. How does the mind go about targeting objects beyond itself? The speculative conjecture of this paper is that it does so by a type of process which can be called pointing, and that the acts or act-aspects of pointing can be called pointers. The notion of a pointer has several suggestive roots. One is the familiar physical gesture of pointing. Another is the existence of directional signs such as on roads. The third is the software data types making direct reference to memory locations in computers, also called 'pointers'. A final source is demonstrative pronouns and other deictic expressions in language, of which Peter Geach wrote, "a demonstrative pronoun...works like a pointer, not like a label". I suggest that there is in the mental cognitive repertoire a structurally and semantically analogous type of act which pierces the passivity of perception, directs us outside the machine, and prepares the way for drawing others' minds to the same thing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Grazer Philosophische Studien is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Grazer Philosophische Studien holder: Brill Academic Publishers dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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