Property rights, extortion and the misallocation of talent.
Extortion is a severe obstacle to doing business in many countries, varying both in its frequency and magnitude across establishments. This paper presents a model of extortion to account for these features and assess its quantitative effects. In the model, entrepreneur capital is subject to extortio...
| Publicado en: | European Economic Review Vol. 98; pp. 86 - 111 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Elsevier B.V.
Sep2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=124756336&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 124756336 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00142921 EER jtl: European Economic Review issn: 00142921 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2017 vid: 98 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier B.V. artinfo: ui: 124756336 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.06.010 ppf: 86 ppct: 25 formats: tig: atl: Property rights, extortion and the misallocation of talent. aug: au: Ranasinghe, Ashantha affil: Department of Economics, University of Manitoba, 501 Fletcher Argue Building, Winnipeg, MB R3T 5V5, Canada su: Property rights Extortion Quantitative research Entrepreneurship Polish economy, 1990- sug: subj: Property rights Extortion Quantitative research Entrepreneurship Polish economy, 1990- keyword: Establishment size Misallocation O1 O4 Establishment size Misallocation O1 O4 ab: Extortion is a severe obstacle to doing business in many countries, varying both in its frequency and magnitude across establishments. This paper presents a model of extortion to account for these features and assess its quantitative effects. In the model, entrepreneur capital is subject to extortion which affects the extensive and intensive margins of entrepreneurship. Extortion rates are endogenous and hump-shaped across entrepreneurs despite common property rights. The quantitative analysis is guided by micro-level evidence related to extortion in Poland and yields a number of implications broadly consistent with establishment-level facts in developing economies. For measures of property rights within a plausible range, output losses can be upwards of 10 percent. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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