ELECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE COST OF UNPOPULARITY.
When considering electoral campaigns, candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding. To offset this unpopularity effect, politicians may either demand more money for campaign adverti...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 1771 - 1792 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=124834508&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 124834508 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2017 vid: 55 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 124834508 10.1111/ecin.12461 ppf: 1771 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 313KB tig: atl: ELECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE COST OF UNPOPULARITY. aug: au: Bassetti, Thomas Pavesi, Filippo affil: Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Management “Marco Fanno,”, University of Padua, 35123, Padova Italy Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Verona, 37129, Verona Italy Stevens Institute of Technology, School of Business, Hoboken NJ, 07030, USA su: Van Hollen, Chris, 1959- Edwards, Donna, 1958- Pressure groups Voters Political action committees Political debates sug: subj: Pressure groups Political Organizations Other Social Advocacy Organizations Environment, Conservation and Wildlife Organizations Human Rights Organizations Social advocacy organizations Voters Political action committees Political debates Van Hollen, Chris, 1959- Edwards, Donna, 1958- ab: When considering electoral campaigns, candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding. To offset this unpopularity effect, politicians may either demand more money for campaign advertising from these industries in order to persuade less informed voters, or shy away from unpopular contributors to avoid losing the support of the informed electorate. Our model predicts that the first effect dominates, and electoral contributions are increasing in industry unpopularity. By using U.S. House elections data and different identification strategies, we provide robust evidence in favor of our predictions. ( JEL D72, P16) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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