Are causal facts really explanatorily emergent? Ladyman and Ross on higher-level causal facts and renormalization group explanation.
In their Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman and Ross defend a novel version of Neo-Russellian metaphysics of causation, which falls into three claims: (1) there are no fundamental physical causal facts, (2) there are higher-level causal facts of the special sciences, and (3) higher-level causal facts are...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 194; no. 7; pp. 2291 - 2306 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=124845994&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 124845994 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2017 vid: 194 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 124845994 10.1007/s11229-014-0530-2 ppf: 2291 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 437KB tig: atl: Are causal facts really explanatorily emergent? Ladyman and Ross on higher-level causal facts and renormalization group explanation. aug: au: Reutlinger, Alexander affil: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy , Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München , Ludwigstr. 31 80539 München Germany su: Causation (Philosophy) Renormalization (Physics) Renormalization group Philosophy of science Ontology sug: subj: Causation (Philosophy) Renormalization (Physics) Renormalization group Philosophy of science Ontology ab: In their Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman and Ross defend a novel version of Neo-Russellian metaphysics of causation, which falls into three claims: (1) there are no fundamental physical causal facts, (2) there are higher-level causal facts of the special sciences, and (3) higher-level causal facts are explanatorily emergent. While accepting claims (1) and (2), I attack claim (3). Ladyman and Ross argue that higher-level causal facts are explanatorily emergent, because (a) certain aspects of these higher-level facts (their universality) can be captured by renormalization group (RG) explanations, and (b) RG explanations are not reductive explanations. However, I argue that RG explanation should be understood as reductive explanations. This result undermines Ladyman and Ross's RG-based argument for the explanatory emergence of higher-level causal facts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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