Inscrutability and visual objects.

The thesis that the visual system represents objects has garnered empirical support from a variety of sources in recent decades. But what kinds of things qualify as 'objects' in the relevant sense? Are they ordinary three-dimensional bodies? Are they the facing surfaces of three-dimensional bodies?...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 194; no. 8; pp. 2949 - 2972
Autor principal: Phillips, Ben
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Phillips, Ben
        affil: The Graduate Center , City University of New York , 365 Fifth Ave New York 10016 USA
      su:
        Visual perception
        Philosophical analysis
        Indeterminism (Philosophy)
        Object tracking (Computer vision)
        Object recognition (Computer vision)
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          Visual perception
          Philosophical analysis
          Indeterminism (Philosophy)
          Object tracking (Computer vision)
          Object recognition (Computer vision)
      keyword:
        Indeterminacy
        Inscrutability
        Multiple-object tracking
        Perception
        Visual objects
        Visual reference
      ab: The thesis that the visual system represents objects has garnered empirical support from a variety of sources in recent decades. But what kinds of things qualify as 'objects' in the relevant sense? Are they ordinary three-dimensional bodies? Are they the facing surfaces of three-dimensional bodies? I argue that there is no fact of the matter: what we have are equally acceptable ways of assigning extensions to the relevant visual states. The view I defend bears obvious similarities to Quine's thesis that linguistic reference is inscrutable. Importantly, though, I argue that even if Quine was wrong about inscrutability as a thesis about language and thought, the case for the inscrutability of visual reference remains strong.
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    language: English
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