Visual Reference and Iconic Content.
Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional a...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 84; no. 4; pp. 761 - 782 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2017
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=125138435&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 125138435 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2017 vid: 84 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 125138435 10.1086/693876 ppf: 761 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 587KB tig: atl: Visual Reference and Iconic Content. aug: au: Echeverri, Santiago su: Evidence Cognitive science Human beings Animals Representation (Philosophy) Naturalization sug: subj: Evidence Cognitive science Human beings Animals Representation (Philosophy) Naturalization ab: Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments against representational accounts, and has explanatory advantages. I draw general lessons for the philosophy of perception and the naturalization of intentionality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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