The applicability of mathematics to physical modality.
This paper argues that scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between the mathematical entities that are indispensible to scientific explanation and the modal structure of the empirical phenomena those entities explain. The argument presupposes that scientific realism...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 194; no. 9; pp. 3361 - 3378 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Sep2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=125256858&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 125256858 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2017 vid: 194 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 125256858 10.1007/s11229-016-1067-3 ppf: 3361 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 407KB tig: atl: The applicability of mathematics to physical modality. aug: au: Berenstain, Nora affil: University of Tennessee , Knoxville USA su: Realism Modal logic Structuralism Mathematics Metaphysics sug: subj: Realism Modal logic Structuralism Mathematics Metaphysics keyword: Applicability problem Indispensability argument Mathematical explanation Modality Novel prediction Scientific realism ab: This paper argues that scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between the mathematical entities that are indispensible to scientific explanation and the modal structure of the empirical phenomena those entities explain. The argument presupposes that scientific realism commits us to the indispensability argument. The view presented here is that the indispensability of mathematics commits us not only to the existence of mathematical structures and entities but to a metaphysical determination relation between those entities and the modal structure of the physical world. The no-miracles argument is the primary motivation for scientific realism. It is a presupposition of this argument that unobservable entities are explanatory only when they determine the empirical phenomena they explain. I argue that mathematical entities should also be seen as explanatory only when they determine the empirical facts they explain, namely, the modal structure of the physical world. Thus, scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between mathematics and physical modality that has not been previously recognized. The requirement to account for the metaphysical dependence of modal physical structure on mathematics limits the class of acceptable solutions to the applicability problem that are available to the scientific realist. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|