Clinical Decision-Making: The Case Against The New Casuistry.
Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have argued that the best way to resolve the complex issues in medical settings is to focus on the actual details of cases and then determine what to do in the given cases. This approach to medical decision-making, labeled "casuistry," has met with much criticism. I...
| Publicado en: | Issues in Law & Medicine Vol. 32; no. 2; pp. 143 - 172 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Journal Article |
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Issues in Law & Medicine
Fall2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have argued that the best way to resolve the complex issues in medical settings is to focus on the actual details of cases and then determine what to do in the given cases. This approach to medical decision-making, labeled "casuistry," has met with much criticism. In response, Carson Strong has attempted to save much of Jonsen and Toulmin's version of casuistry. This analysis reveals that Strong's recent salvage efforts fail to deflect the major criticisms. The upshot of this analysis is that Jonsen and Toulmin's version of casuistry is not an appropriate framework from which to resolve complex issues in clinical settings. |
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