Knowledge Is Not Enough.
Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a sou...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 95; no. 4; pp. 658 - 673 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=125435333&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 125435333 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2017 vid: 95 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 125435333 10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959 ppf: 658 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 281KB tig: atl: Knowledge Is Not Enough. aug: au: Nado, Jennifer affil: Lingnan University su: Experimental philosophy Intuition Theory of knowledge Cognition Evidence sug: subj: Experimental philosophy Intuition Theory of knowledge Cognition Evidence keyword: experimental philosophy intuition metaphilosophy ab: Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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