The Problem of Other (Group) Minds (Response to Schwitzgebel).
In recent papers, Eric Schwitzgebel ( Philosophical Studies, 172, 1697-1721, 2015, Philosophia, 44, 877-883, 2016) argues that if physicalism is true, then the United States is probably conscious. My primary aim here is to demonstrate that the source of Schwitzgebel's conditional argument is the 'Pr...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 45; no. 3; pp. 1099 - 1113 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=125460616&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 125460616 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2017 vid: 45 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 125460616 10.1007/s11406-017-9876-2 ppf: 1099 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 450KB tig: atl: The Problem of Other (Group) Minds (Response to Schwitzgebel). aug: au: Dahan, Orli affil: Multidisciplinary Studies , Tel-Hai College , 12208 Upper Galilee Israel su: Other minds (Theory of knowledge) Materialism Dualism Quality (Philosophy) Functionalism (Psychology) Philosophical behaviorism Causation (Philosophy) Schwitzgebel, Eric sug: subj: Other minds (Theory of knowledge) Materialism Dualism Quality (Philosophy) Functionalism (Psychology) Philosophical behaviorism Causation (Philosophy) Schwitzgebel, Eric keyword: behaviorism causal role functionalism Physicalism problem of other minds property dualism ab: In recent papers, Eric Schwitzgebel ( Philosophical Studies, 172, 1697-1721, 2015, Philosophia, 44, 877-883, 2016) argues that if physicalism is true, then the United States is probably conscious. My primary aim here is to demonstrate that the source of Schwitzgebel's conditional argument is the 'Problem of Other Minds,' which is a general problem; wherefore, Schwitzgebel's conclusion should be revised and applied not only to physicalism, but to most contemporary theories of the mind. I analyze the difference between Schwitzgebel's argument and other arguments against functionalism, arguing that the difference between them is rooted in referring to the causal role of the whole system, rather than referring to the casual role of the system's parts. This key difference between functionalism and behaviorism explains why the source of Schwitzgebel's argument stems from the problem of other minds. I conclude that however counterintuitive from a metaphysical point of view, the United States may have its own stream of consciousness, but it has nothing to do with physicalism in particular. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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