Multi-battle Contests: An Experimental Study.
We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all-pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best-of-three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that s...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 84; no. 2; pp. 407 - 426 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=125541432&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 125541432 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2017 vid: 84 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 125541432 10.1002/soej.12182 ppf: 407 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 355KB tig: atl: Multi-battle Contests: An Experimental Study. aug: au: Mago, Shakun D. Sheremeta, Roman M. affil: Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond, 28 Westhampton Way, Richmond, VA 23173, USA. Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866 Received June 2016; accepted September 2016. su: Contests Winning & losing (Contests & competitions) Patents Prizes (Contests & competitions) Auctions sug: subj: Contests All Other Legal Services Offices of Lawyers Winning & losing (Contests & competitions) Patents Prizes (Contests & competitions) Auctions keyword: C72 C91 D72 C72 C91 D72 ab: We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all-pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best-of-three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceed to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multidimensional iterative reasoning and a nonmonetary utility of winning. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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