How to Be a Substantivalist Without Getting Shifty About It*.
According to substantivalism, spacetime points and regions are real entities whose existence is not dependent on matter. In this paper, I motivate and defend a version of substantivalism which takes the totality of spacetime as fundamental, and show how this position avoids certain problem cases, in...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 27; no. 1; pp. 223 - 250 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=125591605&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 125591605 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2017 vid: 27 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 125591605 10.1111/phis.12109 ppf: 223 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 369KB tig: atl: How to Be a Substantivalist Without Getting Shifty About It*. aug: au: Perry, Zee R. affil: Rutgers University, New Brunswick su: Spacetime Metaphysics Ontology Dualism Physics sug: subj: Spacetime Metaphysics Ontology Dualism Physics ab: According to substantivalism, spacetime points and regions are real entities whose existence is not dependent on matter. In this paper, I motivate and defend a version of substantivalism which takes the totality of spacetime as fundamental, and show how this position avoids certain problem cases, in particular the objection from static Leibniz shifts, and better conforms to how we think about space in physics. I argue that, even though the static Leibniz shifts do not show ordinary substantivalism is committed to in-principle undetectable physical structure (pace Dasgupta (2015a)), they do indicate something problematic about the modal profile of space-time and its constituents. While the problem is modal, the solution cannot be solely a matter of revising the substantivalist's modal claims. Rather, I argue, the substantivalist must revise her background ontology of space-time. I show how this can be done by developing substantivalist theory that rejects this picture in favor of an alternative ontology of space-time in the spirit of priority monism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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