Ethics and Science: Is Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder?
This paper argues that morality is objective in a specific sense that accords with a broadly expressivist stance in metaethics. The paper also explains that although there is a kind of subjectivity in moral inquiry, the same holds for other kinds of normative inquiry, including epistemic and even sc...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 20; no. 4; pp. 737 - 750 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=125727932&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 125727932 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2017 vid: 20 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 125727932 10.1007/s10677-017-9818-x ppf: 737 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 404KB tig: atl: Ethics and Science: Is Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder? aug: au: Gibbard, Allan affil: Department of Philosophy , University of Michigan , Ann Arbor USA su: Plausibility (Logic) Expressivism (Ethics) Theory of knowledge Objectivity Normativity (Ethics) Ethics sug: subj: Plausibility (Logic) Expressivism (Ethics) Theory of knowledge Objectivity Normativity (Ethics) Ethics keyword: Disagreement Expressivism Normativity Science ab: This paper argues that morality is objective in a specific sense that accords with a broadly expressivist stance in metaethics. The paper also explains that although there is a kind of subjectivity in moral inquiry, the same holds for other kinds of normative inquiry, including epistemic and even scientific inquiry, and moreover that this kind of subjectivity is no threat to morality's objectivity. The argument for the objectivity of morality draws strong parallels between ethics, epistemology, and science, but does not depend on equally strong parallels between ethics and mathematics. I argue that there is more to learn from a comparison between ethics and mathematics than I used to think, but the difference between the issues that come up in thinking about objectivity in ethics and those that come up in thinking about objectivity in mathematics is substantial, and we cannot carry over results from the philosophy of mathematics to the case of morality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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