From Geometry to Conceptual Relativity.

The purported fact that geometric theories formulated in terms of points and geometric theories formulated in terms of lines are 'equally correct' is often invoked in arguments for conceptual relativity, in particular by Putnam and Goodman. We discuss a few notions of equivalence between first-order...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 82; no. 5; pp. 1043 - 1064
Autores principales: Barrett, Thomas, Halvorson, Hans
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Oct2017
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Barrett, Thomas
          Halvorson, Hans
        affil: Princeton University , Princeton USA
      su:
        Relativity
        Contextualism (Philosophy)
        Theory of knowledge
        Argument
        Metaphysics
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          Relativity
          Contextualism (Philosophy)
          Theory of knowledge
          Argument
          Metaphysics
      ab: The purported fact that geometric theories formulated in terms of points and geometric theories formulated in terms of lines are 'equally correct' is often invoked in arguments for conceptual relativity, in particular by Putnam and Goodman. We discuss a few notions of equivalence between first-order theories, and we then demonstrate a precise sense in which this purported fact is true. We argue, however, that this fact does not undermine metaphysical realism.
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    language: English
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