'Learning (Not) To' and Practical Knowledge.

The author raises objections to the intellectualist analysis of knowing-how on the basis of certain features of 'learning to' ascriptions. He starts by observing that 'learning to' ascriptions can only have a first-personal reading. Since embedded questions make the generic reading available, this s...

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Publicado en:Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol. 94; no. 4; pp. 495 - 524
Autor principal: Douskos, Christos
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Brill Academic Publishers 2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Douskos, Christos
        affil: Hellenic Open University
      su:
        Learning ability
        Theory of knowledge
        Developmental continuity
        Theory-practice relationship
        Cognitive structures
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        subj:
          Learning ability
          Theory of knowledge
          Developmental continuity
          Theory-practice relationship
          Cognitive structures
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        intellectualism
        knowing-how
        learning ascriptions
      ab: The author raises objections to the intellectualist analysis of knowing-how on the basis of certain features of 'learning to' ascriptions. He starts by observing that 'learning to' ascriptions can only have a first-personal reading. Since embedded questions make the generic reading available, this suggests that 'learning to' ascriptions are not embedded question configurations. Then the author locates an ambiguity in 'learning to' ascriptions. They can be used to ascribe either the acquisition of practical knowledge, or the acquisition of a behavioural disposition--a habit--of some value. Once this ambiguity is taken into account, it can be shown that the embedded infinitival in practical learning ascriptions cannot be negated, by contrast to embedded question configurations. This suggests that the semantic value of the infinitival is not propositional. Hence the intellectualist analysis fails to extend to learning ascriptions, and cannot accommodate the systematic relationships between knowledge and learning. The two points above regarding 'learning to' ascriptions extend to ascriptions of practical knowledge in certain languages.
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    language: English
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