Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies.
Selection (adverse or advantageous) is the central problem that inhibits the smooth, efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets. Even-and perhaps especially-when consumers are well-informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice, such markets...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 31; no. 4; pp. 23 - 51 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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American Economic Association
Nov2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=125990749&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 125990749 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 08953309 JEC jtl: Journal of Economic Perspectives issn: 08953309 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2017 vid: 31 iid: 4 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 125990749 10.1257/jep.31.4.23 ppf: 23 ppct: 28 formats: tig: atl: Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies. aug: au: Geruso, Michael Layton, Timothy J. affil: Michael Geruso is Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Texas, Austin, Texas. Timothy J. Layton is Assistant Professor of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts. Both authors are Faculty Research Fellows, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. su: United States Health insurance Economic competition Medicare Externalities Health insurance exchanges sug: subj: Health insurance Economic competition Medicare Externalities United States Direct group life, health and medical insurance carriers Direct individual life, health and medical insurance carriers Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs) Health insurance exchanges ab: Selection (adverse or advantageous) is the central problem that inhibits the smooth, efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets. Even-and perhaps especially-when consumers are well-informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice, such markets may function inefficiently due to risk selection. Selection can cause markets to unravel with skyrocketing premiums and can cause consumers to be under- or overinsured. In its simplest form, adverse selection arises due to the tendency of those who expect to incur high health care costs in the future to be the most motivated purchasers. The costlier enrollees are more likely to become insured rather than to remain uninsured, and conditional on having health insurance, the costlier enrollees sort themselves to the more generous plans in the choice set. These dual problems represent the primary concerns for policymakers designing regulations for health insurance markets. In this essay, we review the theory and evidence concerning selection in competitive health insurance markets and discuss the common policy tools used to address the problems it creates. We emphasize the two markets that seem especially likely to be targets of reform in the short and medium term: Medicare Advantage (the private plan option available under Medicare) and the state-level individual insurance markets. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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