Must cognition be representational?
In various contexts and for various reasons, writers often define cognitive processes and architectures as those involving representational states and structures. Similarly, cognitive theories are also often delineated as those that invoke representations. In this paper, I present several reasons fo...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 194; no. 11; pp. 4197 - 4215 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=126215325&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 126215325 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2017 vid: 194 iid: 11 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 126215325 10.1007/s11229-014-0644-6 ppf: 4197 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 384KB tig: atl: Must cognition be representational? aug: au: Ramsey, William affil: Department of Philosophy , University of Nevada , Las Vegas USA su: Representation (Philosophy) Cognition Ethnopsychology Culture Deflationary theory of truth sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Cognition Ethnopsychology Culture Deflationary theory of truth keyword: Demarcation criteria Folk psychology Marr's levels Representation demarcation thesis Representationalism ab: In various contexts and for various reasons, writers often define cognitive processes and architectures as those involving representational states and structures. Similarly, cognitive theories are also often delineated as those that invoke representations. In this paper, I present several reasons for rejecting this way of demarcating the cognitive. Some of the reasons against defining cognition in representational terms are that doing so needlessly restricts our theorizing, it undermines the empirical status of the representational theory of mind, and it encourages wildly deflationary and explanatorily vacuous conceptions of representation. After criticizing this outlook, I sketch alternative ways we might try to capture what is distinctive about cognition and cognitive theorizing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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