REPUTATION TRANSMISSION WITHOUT BENEFIT TO THE REPORTER: A BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNING OF MARKETS IN EXPERIMENTAL FOCUS.
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner witho...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 56; no. 1; pp. 158 - 173 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=126419574&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 126419574 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2018 vid: 56 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 126419574 10.1111/ecin.12477 ppf: 158 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 316KB tig: atl: REPUTATION TRANSMISSION WITHOUT BENEFIT TO THE REPORTER: A BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNING OF MARKETS IN EXPERIMENTAL FOCUS. aug: au: Kamei, Kenju Putterman, Louis affil: Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LB, UK Professor, Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912. su: Reputation Cooperation Emotions Social psychology Behavioral economics sug: subj: Reputation Cooperation Emotions Social psychology Behavioral economics ab: Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. ( JEL C91, D03, D63) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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