Synthetic Biology, Genome Editing, and the Risk of Bioterrorism.
The SynBioSecurity argument says that synthetic biology introduces new risks of intentional misuse of synthetic pathogens and that, therefore, there is a need for extra regulations and oversight. This paper provides an analysis of the argument, sets forth a new version of it, and identifies three de...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 23; no. 6; pp. 1541 - 1562 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=126439590&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 126439590 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2017 vid: 23 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 126439590 10.1007/s11948-016-9868-9 ppf: 1541 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 464KB tig: atl: Synthetic Biology, Genome Editing, and the Risk of Bioterrorism. aug: au: Ahteensuu, Marko affil: Unit of Philosophy, Turku Institute for Advanced Studies , University of Turku , Assistentikatu 7 20014 Turku Finland su: Synthetic biology Genome editing Bioterrorism Biosecurity Science & ethics European Union sug: subj: Synthetic biology Genome editing Bioterrorism Biosecurity Science & ethics European Union keyword: Ethics Regulation Risk ab: The SynBioSecurity argument says that synthetic biology introduces new risks of intentional misuse of synthetic pathogens and that, therefore, there is a need for extra regulations and oversight. This paper provides an analysis of the argument, sets forth a new version of it, and identifies three developments that raise biosecurity risks compared to the situation earlier. The developments include (1) a spread of the required know-how, (2) improved availability of the techniques, instruments and biological parts, and (3) new technical possibilities such as 'resurrecting' disappeared pathogens. It is first shown that the general argument from SynBioSecurity needs to be qualified and that many improvements to biosecurity have already been implemented, most notably in the United States. Second, I suggest a new strain of the argument: the situation that most branches of synthetic biology fall under the gene technology regulation in the European Union and that this regulation in its current form does not adequately address SynBioSecurity risks together provide a weighty reason to review and possibly refine the legislation as well as the supervisory practices. Ethically speaking, the rise in the relative risk of bioterrorism brings to the fore new extrinsic issues. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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