Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.
Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sens...
| Publicado en: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 98; pp. 643 - 662 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2017 Supplement S1
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=126984778&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 126984778 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02790750 PHZ jtl: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly issn: 02790750 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2017 Supplement S1 vid: 98 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 126984778 10.1111/papq.12203 ppf: 643 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 148KB tig: atl: Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment. aug: au: Fritz, James affil: Department of Philosophy The Ohio State University su: Theory of knowledge Attribution (Social psychology) Pragmatism Ethics Philosophy sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Attribution (Social psychology) Pragmatism Ethics Philosophy ab: Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This article argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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