Diplomacy Through Agents.
Leaders generally conduct diplomacy through relatively autonomous agents. I argue that delegating diplomacy allows for credible communication by constraining leaders' ability to bluff. Specifically, leaders can choose diplomats who place some value on the interests of their host countries. Such dipl...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 61; no. 3; pp. 544 - 557 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Sep2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=127011551&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 127011551 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2017 vid: 61 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 127011551 10.1093/isq/sqx037 ppf: 544 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 127011551 tig: atl: Diplomacy Through Agents. aug: au: LINDSEY, DAVID affil: Princeton University su: Page, Walter Hines, 1855-1918 Diplomacy International communication Truthfulness & falsehood Diplomats sug: subj: Diplomacy International communication Truthfulness & falsehood Diplomats Page, Walter Hines, 1855-1918 ab: Leaders generally conduct diplomacy through relatively autonomous agents. I argue that delegating diplomacy allows for credible communication by constraining leaders' ability to bluff. Specifically, leaders can choose diplomats who place some value on the interests of their host countries. Such diplomats will only oppose foreign government policies when these impose large costs on their home country. Consequently, a message from such a diplomat enjoys greater credibility than one from a diplomat whose preferences mirror those of the leader. This gain in credibility increases the leader's chances of obtaining concessions when the diplomat opposes foreign policies and reduces the probability of conflict. I show formally that, for the leader, the optimal diplomat is always biased in this way because the increased credibility offsets the diplomat's occasional failure to support the leader's position. I conclude with a case study focused on the career of Ambassador Walter Hines Page. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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