From Welfare to Rights without Changing the Subject.
In this paper I introduce the 'changing the subject' problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 20; no. 5; pp. 993 - 1005 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=127064646&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 127064646 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2017 vid: 20 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 127064646 10.1007/s10677-017-9856-4 ppf: 993 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 433KB tig: atl: From Welfare to Rights without Changing the Subject. aug: au: Hadley, John affil: School of Humanities and Communication Arts , Western Sydney University , 10a. G. 07 Bankstown Campus, Locked Bag 1797 Penrith 2751 Australia su: Dignity Animal rights Animal welfare Expressivism (Ethics) Circus Law sug: subj: Dignity Animal rights Animal welfare Expressivism (Ethics) Circus Law keyword: Animal ethics Animals Circuses Expressivism Noncognitivism Pain Respect Rights Welfare Wellbeing ab: In this paper I introduce the 'changing the subject' problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from the capacity to suffer and the moral significance of causing animals pain. To avoid this problem and ensure that debate proceeds in the familiar terms of the established welfare paradigm, I present an expressivist analysis of animal rights vocabulary. When terms such as dignity and respect are understood in line with the theory of moral language use known as expressivism, proponents of animal protection that use these terms can escape the charge of changing the subject. Drawing upon Helm's theory of love, I show how the usage of rights vocabulary can be respectable way for people to register their concern for the welfare of animals, even at times when it is unlikely that the animals concerned are suffering. Tying rights vocabulary to welfare via expressivism aligns the aims of animal rights with welfare without the theoretical problems associated with attempts to 'reduce' dignity or respect to natural behaviour or inherent value. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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